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Although the federal courts derive no "jurisdiction in crim-
inal matters from the common law," they clearly have what has
been expressed as "jurisdiction of the common law," 58 to give
effect to the powers conferred by statute; and since many of the
crimes defined by federal statutes are those which had a definite
meaning in English common law, and in the common law of the
colonies at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, the prin-
ciples obtained from these sources constitute an indispensable
guide to federal judges in administering criminal jurisdiction.
Otherwise, it would sometimes be impossible to determine the
character of the offenses which have been declared criminal by
statute; for, in most cases, federal statutes defining wrongs as
criminal do so only in general terms, or simply by title, 9 and
the ingredients which constitute the offenses with which they
deal must be ascertained by resorting to the English and the
state common-law systems; accordingly, the common-law prin-
ciples thus derived become the ultimate arbiter of the statutory
offenses in question,.60 and the federal courts, in interpreting the
Constitution, treaties and statutes in the light of the common law,
exercise only the ordinary judicial prerogative of resorting to
the sources which will most effectively aid them in carrying out
their powers.
The same principle applies to the interpretation of criminal
matters dealt with in the Constitution itself; for, in the words
of Mr. Justice Mathews:
"DUPoNCEAU, JURISDICTION, supra, 20; KENT'S COMMENTARIES, I, 339.
'WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW (IIth ed. 1912), I, §§ ,-7; CONKLING'S
JuRisDIcTioN, 82-83; U. S. v. Coolidge, I Gallison 488, 491, Fed. Cas. No.
14,857 (C. C. 1815), per Story, 1.
"WHARTON, ibd.
(270)
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"The interpretation of the Constitution of the United
States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions
are formed in the language of the English common law and
are to be read in the light of its history."
To this, he added the following significant observation,
which gives voice to the controlling thought of our present thesis;
he said:
"The code of constitutional and statutory construction
which is gradually formed by judgments of this court in the
application of the Constitution, and the laws and treaties
made in pursuance thereof, has for its basis so much of
the common law as may be implied in the subject, and con-
stitutes a common law-resting on national authority." a'
While this observation was made in the course of the exer-
cise of i particular jurisdiction, it will be shown, as we proceed
with our considerations, that the thoight involved has general
application.
Mr. Justice Brown, speaking along the same. general lines,
for the Supreme Court of the United States, once said:
"We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light
of the law as it existed at the time it was adopted, not as
reaching out for new guarantees of the rights of the citi-
zens, but as securing to every individual such as he already
possessed as a British subject-such as his ancestors had
inherited and defended since the days of the Magia
Hence, when the Constitution expressly provides that "no
bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed,"" the
courts must necessarily determine the recognized meaning these
terms conveyed at the time the Constitution was ratified; or, in
other words, their common-law meaning.
For another example of the same sort of construction, when
the fifth amendment guarantees that "No person shall be held.
Smith v. Alabama, x24 U. S. 46& 478-9 (x888).
Mattox v' U. S., 156 U. S. 27, 20 (1804).
Article I, 19.
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to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on
presentment or indictment of a grand jury," the question as
to what is an infamous crime becomes an important matter of
interpretation, and the federal Supreme Court has said that it
"could not accede to the proposition, sometimes maintained, that
no crime is 'infamous' within the meaning of the fifth anend-
ment that has not been so declared by Congress"; and, further,
in effect, that we must resort to the common law for the meaning
of this term.
64
In Schick v. United States,6" the federal Supreme Court
again declared that the national Constitution "must be read in
the light of the common law," and, when so viewed, it was quite
plain that our fundamental law did not forbid a waiver of trial
by jury for a minor offense.
In still another case, the Supreme Court, said, the guaran-
tee of trial by jury "implies, not merely that the form of a jury
trial be preserved, but also all its substantial elements"; and, in
discussing what such elements arc, the court went on to say:
"Now unanimity was required of trial by jury at the common
law . . . and . . . a statute which destroys this substantial
and essential feature is one abridging the right." 06 Here, again,
as you see, resort is had to the general principles of the English
common law, as necessary to constitutional construction.
There is, perhaps, no one thing more precious to the individ-
ual in the protection of his liberties than the writ of habeas cor-
pus; yet the only reference to it in the Constitution is contained
in article I, section 9, sub-section 2, which provides that "The
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety
may require it." If nothing further had been stated than is
"Ex parte Wilson, 114 U. S. 417, 422, 426 (1884).
x95 U. S. 65, 67-69 (1904).
" Mr. Justice Brewer in American Pub. Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464, 467
(1896); Walker v. So. Pacific R. R., 165 U. S. 593 (1896).
"Trial by. jury in the primary and usual sense of the term at common law
and in the American constitutions is a trial by a jury of twelve men in the
presence and under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them
upon the law and to advise them upon the facts." Gray, J., in Capital Tract.
Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 13 (188).
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contained in this provision of the Constitution, or in the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789,67 which authorizes the courts of the United
States and the judges thereof to issue the writ, the privilege thus
conferred would, in the words of Story, "be a mere dead letter
for its most important purposes," since, again quoting from
Story, "It is only by engrafting on the authority of the statutes
the doctrine of the common law that this writ is made the great
bulwark of the citizen against the oppressions of the govern-
ment." 68
Similarly, it is necessary to interpret through the common
law the extent of the pardoning power of the President. Article
II, section 2, of the Constitution provides: "The President shall
have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against
the United States, except in cases of impeachment." The lan-
guage here employed as to the power of pardoning must be con-
strued by resorting to instances of the exercise of that power
in England prior to the Revolution, and in America prior t6 the
adoption of the Constitution. As the Supreme Court has
stated: 69
"It was with the fullest knowledge of the law upon the
subject of pardons and of the philosophy of government in
its bearing upon the Constitution when [we] instructed
Chief Justice Marshall to say,70 'as the power has been
exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that
nation whose language is our language and to whose judicial
institutions ours bear a close resemblance, we adopt their
principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon,
and look into their books for the rules prescribing'the man-
ner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail
himself of it."'
Then the court added:
"We still think so, and that the language used in the
Constitution conferring the power to grant reprieves and
i Stat. at L. 81, ch. 20, § 14.
Story, J., U. S. v. Coolidge, - Gallison 488, Fed. Cas. No. 14,857 (C. C.
1815). Since the first Act of 1789, six statutes have been passed dealing with
the granting of the writ. However, none was passed until 1833.
0 Ex parte Wells, 18 Howard 307, 310-11 (U. S. 1855).
"U. S. v. Wilson, 7 Peters xio, i6o (U. S. 1833).
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pardons must be construed with reference to its [common-
law] meaning at the time of its adoption." 71
All the foregoing instances, in which it was necessary to
resort for purposes of interpretation 7 2 to the English common
law, are important as showing that there is, as Mr. Justice Math-
ews said, "a common law of interpretation resting on national
authority." 78 We must remember, though, that, in the cases
under discussion, the common law was not used as a means of
extending jurisdiction, or of enlarging substantive rights and
duties, but only as a means of understanding and properly ad-
ministering rights already created by the Constitution or by
federal statute. This so-called "common law of interpretation"
is, however, a form of unwritten law, and therefore may be con-
sidered as part of the federal common law, designated as "a
conmon law resting on national authority"; this is so, even on
the criminal side of federal jurisprudence, which, in the main,
up to the present, we have been considering. Now let us turn
to the subject of federal civil jurisdiction.
74
'See an interesting modem exposition of this subject by Taft, CJ., in
U. S. v. Grossman, U. S. Adv. Reports, March 2, 1925, 45 Sup. Ct. 332.
It is interesting to note among these cases of interpretation the question
of impeachment. By Article II, § 4, "The President, Vice-President, and all
civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment
for and conviction of Treason, Bribery, or other high crimes and mis-
demeanors." While this is a question not for the courts, but for the Senate,
it illustrates the importance of the common law as a hecessary guide in inter-
preting the Constitution. -Treason is defined in the Constitution itself; for the
definition of bribery, resort must be had to the common law. What are and
what are not high crimes and misdemeanors is to be ascertained by recourse
to the same system of jurisprudence. See STORY, CONsTrrvION, I, §§ 796-800;
BuRaicx, LAw OF THE AmERiCAN CONSTrUTION, 87; RAWLE, CONSTITUTION
(2d ed. i829), 273.
"Smith v. Alabama, supra.
" Mr. Duer, "a contemporary admirer of Madison," and a commentator
on the Constitution, said in writing of the common law in the Federal courts,
"It has been a subject of much discussion whether the United States, in their
national capacity, have actually adopted the common law, and to what extent,
if at all, it may be considered a part of national jurisprudence. . . . The
general question as to the application and influence of the system in reference
to our national institutions, has not been settled upon clear and definite prin-
ciples, and may still be regarded, especially in civil cases, as open for further
investigation." Duna's CoNSTITUTIONAL JUSISPRUDENCE, 42.
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FEDERAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
So far as the power to entertain jurisdiction in civil cases
is concerned, it is provided by article III, section 2, sub-section
I, of the Constitution that "the judicial power [of the United
States] shall extend [inter alia] to all cases in law and equity
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States,
and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority
. . ., to controversies between two or more states . . . [and]
between citizens of different States." Here we have a grant
of national judicial power, to be exercised when certain specified
conditions exist; and, pursuant to article III, section I, Congress
has created (with the exception of the Supreme Court, which
is a constitutional tribunal) the courts necessary to give effect
to this jurisdiction.
7 5
It is a well-known rule, and one which needs no special em-
phasis, that, to quote from Chief Justice Marshall, "Courts which
originate in common law possess a jurisdiction which must be
regulated by the common law until some statutes change its
established principles; but courts which are created by written
law and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law, cannot
transcend that jurisdiction." '7 Necessarily, therefore, the fed-
eral courts cannot transcend their constitutional and statutory
jurisdiction.
. Furthermore, unlike a state court whose jurisdiction is said
to be in locum, 7 --that is, a jurisdiction co-extensive with its
territory-the federal courts exercise no exclusive territorial
jurisdiction, except, of course, in places such as the District of
Columbia 78 and the national territories. The jurisdiction con-
"By the Judiciary Act of 1789 and subsequent acts.
"Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 93 (i8o7), per Marshall, CJ.
DuPoNcmAu, JURISDIcTION, 3r, 32.
""As against the United States, regarded as co-extensive with the federal
Union of states and operating within the territorial limits of the states, it is
undoubtedly true that there are no common law offenkes; for the jurisdiction
there given to the United States by the federal constitution is distinctly and
expressly restricted by the powers enumerated in the Constitution. But . . .
as to the authority of the United States in the [District of Columbia] the
question is not what power has been conferred upon it, but rather what power
has been inhibited to it. . . . The United States have supreme and exclusive
power over the District of Columbia, and they are not limited to the govern-
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ferred by the Constitution arises only because of either the sub-
ject-matter involved or the character of the parties in a particular
action; and, in the provisions of the judiciary article of the Con-
stitution, it will be observed .that, among others, there are three
distinct and important classes of cases over which the federal
courts are given jurisdiction: (i) Cases in which citizens of dif-
ferent states are opposite parties; and in this class it is imma-
terial what is the nature of the controversy, for the character of
the parties gives jurisdiction. (2) Cases in which states are par-
ties; and here, again, the subject-matter is immaterial, provided
the case is justiciable. (3) Cases which arise under the Consti-
tution, lazes or treaties of the Union. In this last class, it is im-
material who are parties, for the subject-matter gives jurisdic-
tion.
When courts are created, whether of limited or unlimited
power, they must administer some sort of law in cases within
their jurisdiction; and, as we have already said, if no particular
direction is given concerning the system to be followed, and
there is no constitutional or statutory restriction against adminis-
tering any special kind of law, the courts will not refuse to exer-
cise their jurisdiction simply because of lack of such direction.
7"
On the contrary, if matters within their jurisdiction, on which
statutory law is silent, come before them, they apply such prin-
ciples as will effect a just and proper result under the circum-
stances of each case. Thus the federal courts,
° in the exercise
mental powers in the Constitution specifically enumerated as defining their
jurisdiction for the country at large." De Forest v. U. S., ii App. D. C. 458,
464 (1898), quoted in Harrison v. Moyer, 224 Fed. Rep. 226 (D. C. 19x5);
see also Kendall v. U. S., 37 U. S. (12 Peters) 522 (x838) ; and as to the
jurisdiction of Congress over the territories, Mormon Church v. U. S., 136U. S. 1, 42 (1890).
" "It is apparent that the Federal judiciary is as much entitled, when the
matter is one of Federal jurisdiction, to exercise its own independent judg-
ment and make its own declarations as to what, as affecting the matter in
hand, the unwritten law is, as it is for a state judiciary to declare what such
law is, touching a matter within the jurisdiction of the State." WASHINGrOZ
LAW REPoRTER, Vol. XLVII, 179-I8O (i919).
"The Court of Claims, created by congressional statute, is a court which
exercises jurisdiction, not in and for the District of Columbia, nor for any
district or circuit, but for the entire United States, in all cases against the
national government. The form of procedure is statutory, supplemented by
rules of its own adoption.
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of jurisdiction received from the Constitution or the Congress,
if there is no statute on a particular point, or special direction
concerning the law to be enforced, will administer common-law
principles, when applicable to the circumstances involved: and,
as we shall presently see, in some instances, particularly where
matters of general concern are at stake, the federal judges act
without restriction in determining what these principles are and
the sources from which they shall be deduced, or the authorities
to be followed.
Those who deny the existence of federal common law are
entirely correct in stating that neither the Constitution itself nor
any statute passed in conformity with it has expressly or im-
pliedly adopted the English common law for use in the United
States courts; but, while the principles of that system have not
been adoped as rules of decision, there is no mention, except in
section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, of any other system to
be administered in cases on which statutory law is silent, and
this situation has not precluded the federal courts from exer-
cising their jurisdiction, and administering, for that purpose,
the principles of law they consider appropriate to the circum-
"As to this court thus organized, and clothed with a jurisdiction wholly
national in character, the express ruling of the Supreme Court is to the effect
that the general law controlling its action is the common law. . . There is
no act of Congress which adopts the common law as the rule of action for
the Court of Claims. The reasons which declare the common law to be the
system governing its action apply equally to the other courts of the United
States." Murray v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 24, 38 (C. C. 1894),
per Shiras, J.
In Moore v. U. S., 91 U. S. 270-4 (z876), Mr. Justice Bradley said:
"The Court of Claims, like a court of equity or admiralty, or an ecclesias-
tical court, determines the facts as well as the law; and the question is,
whether they may determine the genuineness of a signature by comparing it
with other handwriting of the party. By the general rule of the common
law, this cannot be done either by the court or a jury; and that is the general
rule of this country, although the courts of a few states have allowed it,
and the legislatures of others, as well as of England, have authorized it. In
the ecclesiastical courts, which derived their forms of proceeding from the
civil law, a different rule prevails. The question is, By what law is the Court
of Claims to be governed in this respect? May it adopt its own rules of evi-
dence? or is it to be governed by some system of law? In our opinion, it must
be governed by law; and we know of no system of law by which it should be
governed other than the common law. That is the system from which our
judicial ideas and legal definitions are derived."
See also U. S. v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262 (1888); Reynolds v. N. Y. Trust
Co., 188 Fed. 611 (C. C. A. 1gxi).
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stances before them. These principles have been largely drawn
from the English common law, for that system, forming as it
does the basis of American jurisprudence, permeates all our in-
stitutions, and the federal judges quite naturally resort to it; but
in matters of general concern they consider themselves free to
consult also the decisions of the vanous state courts, the 'ivil
law, or other sources, and to deduce from them what they con-
ceive to be the true rules in any case. The accumulation of these
rules as administered in-the federal courts represents a body of
unwritten law, and one which, if our original analysis of the
nature of common law be correct, can justifiably be termed a
federal common law. Consequently, we may assert that the fail-
ure to adopt, in the Constitution or congressional statutes, the
English common law, does not prevent the federal courts from
possessing their own common law on the civil side; 81 and, fur-
ther, that, from necessity, they are gradually building up, by
their successive decisions in particular cases, a body of princi-
ples--or, in this sense, an independent system of common law-
as we shall see by examining their exercise of the jurisdiction
expressly granted to them.
In discussing the three before-mentioned distinct classes of
cases within the civil jurisdiction of the federal courts, as set
forth in the judiciary article of the Constitution, it seems best
to consider them in the following, order.
i. Controversies between Citizens of Different States
There is no branch of federal jurisdiction which is as inter-
esting in the study of our subject, or which has developed so
extensively, as that arising from diversity of citizenship. It
has assumed an importance which, as a reading of the convention
""It would be a most extra-ordinary state of things that the [English]
common law should be the basis of the jurisprudence of the states originally
composing the Union, and yet a government ingrafted upon the existing sys-
tem should have no jurisprudence at all. If such be the result, there is no
guide and no rule for the courts of the United States . . . except so far as
Congress has laid or shall lay down a rule." SToxy, CoNsTITUToN (5th ed.
,801), I, pl sIt.
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debates 8 2 and contemporary literatureas  will disclose, was
clearly not foreseen by the framers.
In view of local jealousies at the time of the constitutional
convention, it was but natural for each state to suppose that,
when its citizens' causes were being tried in another state, they
might be subjected to "local prejudices and sectional views."
Hence there was a desire to provide an impartial court, in which
the non-citizen would receive the application of the same law
as a state court would give its own citizens. This "guarantee
of impartiality" would, in those times, have been a very valuable
privilege to "a Puritan from New England, engaged in litigation
with a Pennsylvania Quaker, or a far-off South Carolinian,
claiming to recover land in New York from a citizen thereof
holding some possessory title"; 8 4 consequently the diverse-citi-
zenship clause was inserted in the Constitution to insure no dis-
crimination against non-citizens in the administration of justice.
'There is not a trace," says Mr. Warren, "of any other purpose
than the above to be found in any of the arguments made in
1787-1789 as to-this jurisdiction." Then he adds:
"The idea that a federal court in a state was to ad-
minister any other than the law of that state, or was to...
administer law as an entirely free and independent tri-
bunal, never appears to have entered the mind of any-
one." 8Z
"E.uowrs DzaATzs, Vol. IHI, pp. 433, 549, 556, 570.
I-IAmToN, Tin FzDEnAST, LXXX: "If it be a just principle. that
every governent ought to possess the means of executing its onpoiin
by its own authority, it will follow that in order to the inviol main-
tenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the citizens of
the Union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases
in which one state or its citizens are opposed to another state or its citizens.
To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion
and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed to
that tribunal which, having no local attachments, will be licely to be impartial
between the different states and their citizens."
MW. M. Meigs, 45 Am. L. REv. 47, 5o (igu).
WARREN, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act, 37
H,'av. L. Rzv. 49, 83 (x924).
See also Euaors DEBATEs, III, 551, 56, 557.
When John Marshall was questioned in the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion "In what court and by what law, in cases arising under the citizenship
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Even though the correctness of Mr. Warren's statement be
conceded, still, if, as a matter of fact, the situation has developed
otherwise, should not this be acknowledged? Again, though
some writers appear to think the original intent was that state
common law, as laid down by the courts of the state where the
federal trial tribunal might be located, should be strictly fol-
lowed by federal courts in cases between citizens of different
states, and no independent federal common raw was intended to
be developed, yet, in the absence of an express prohibition of
that course, was not the final development of a federal common
law inevitable? Both these questions, it seems, must be an-
swered in the affirmative, as will be shown.
To give effect to the jurisdiction created by the diverse-
citizenship clause of the Constitution, and to prescribe the law
which shouldbe administered in such cases, Congress provided,
by section 34 of the Act of 1789, organizing the first judiciary,
that the "laws of the several states, except where the Constitu-
tion, treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise re-
quire or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials
at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where
they apply." 11 It seems to have been intended that the word
"laws" in this act should include not only the statutes of the
particular state in which the case was tried, but also its common
law as well; and Mr. Warren claims that the federal courts,
when deciding cases arising under the diverse-citizenship clause,
were intended always to follow8 7 state law, both statute and
clause, the case would be tried?" his answer was, "By the law of the place
where the contract was made."
See also Lankford v. Platt Iron Works, 235 U. S. 461, 478 (1914);
Scott v. Sandford, ig Howard 393, 58o (U. S. 1856).
x Stat. 9z. As to meaning of trials at common law, see note 4, supra.
U"That Congress which passed the Judiciary Act intended to limit 'the
laws' to statutes, seems very improbable; if for no other reason, because in
many of the states, the statute law was so meagre, and for the first 50 years
of the Government no such limitation was put on the expression, 'the laws,'
by the Supreme Court. In no case did that court sanction a refusal by a
Federal Court to follow a rule laid down by the State Courts. It is to be
observed, however, that the only cases during this period which came before
the court, where any question as to following the decisions of a State Court
was presented, were cases concerning land or involving the interpretation of a
State Constitution or statute." GRAY, TmE NATURE AND SouRczs OF LAW
(st ed. 1xo), §§ 533-4-
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common. He thinks that this is shown by his discovery of the
original paper on which the amendment containing section 34
was written.A8 As first drafted, the amendment provided that
the "statute law of the several states in force for the time being,
and their unwritten or common law now in use, whether by adop-
tion from the common law of England, the ancient statutes of the
same, or otherwise . . . shall be regarded . . . as rules of de-
cision." Before the amendment was actually submitted, the
words, "statute law" were stricken out and the word "laws" was
inserted with a caret, before the words "of the several states,"
and the succeeding words given above in italics were also elimi-
nated. Mr. Warren argues, with some force, that these changes
indicate "that the word 'laws' was intended to be a concise ex-
pression and a summary of the more detailed enumeration of
different forms of state law set forth in the original draft." 89
The first Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, understood the
meaning of section 34 in this sense, as would appear from his
report to the House of Representatives, December 27, 1790, sug-
gesting amendments to the Judiciary Act Furthermore, counsel
and Chief Justice Ellsworth, in cases 90 as early as i797 and
1799, construed the word "laws" as including the common law
of the states.
During the first half-century of the Supreme Court's his-
tory, it never refused to follow state decisions, whether applying
to the common law or statutes, as the true exposition of the law
of the state involved-a position which Chief Justice Marshall
maintained while he was on the bench; 91 and, although all the
particular state decisions we have in mind either concerned con-
troversies over title to land or had to do with the interpretation
"Warren, 37 Hv. L. Rzv. 49,86 (1924).
=Ibid.
"Brown v. Van Bramm, 3 Dallas 344, 352 (U. S. 1797) ; Sims v. Irvine,
3 Dallas 425, 457 (U. S. 1799).
f45 Am. L. REv. 47, 55 (g1), W. M. Meigs.
36 Am. L. REv. 498, 515 (igo2), E. C. Eliot
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of state constitutions,9 2 there is no intimation to be found in
the federal opinions during the period in question that the court
would not have followed the state law in all kinds of cases. In
short, the settled practice of the federal courts during the first
half-century of our national existence seems to have been a con-
sistent adherence to what Mr. Warren claims to have been the
evident intention of section 34 of the Judiciary Act.
This practice received a severe setback in 1842 at the hands
of Judge Story, in Swift v. Tyson,9 8 which was a suit on a bill
of exchange by the indorsee, a citizen of Maine, against the ac-
ceptor, a citizen of New York, the defense averred being fraud
and failure of consideration. Plaintiff had taken the bill in sat-
isfaction of a pre-existing debt, and the question arose whether
defendant was entitled to produce certain evidence to show that
plaintiff was not a holder for value. By the law of New York,
where the suit was brought, the satisfaction of a debt in such
cases was not a valuable consideration, and it was argued that,
under section 34 of the Judiciary Act, the New York decisions
were conclusive on the federal Supreme Court; but the latter
refused to follow the New York law, and held that plaintiff
was a bona fide holder, the court saying, by Mr. Justice Story:
"In all the various cases which have hitherto come
before us for decision this court has uniformly supposed
that the true interpretation of section 34 limited its appli-
cation to state 'laws strictly local, that is to say, to the
positive statutes of the state and the construction thereof
adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to
things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and
titles to real estate and other matters immovable and intra-
territorial in their nature and character; and we have not
the slightest difficulty in holding that this section, upon its
BunDmcx, LAw oF THE AmxcAN CoxsrrruToN (1922), § 48, says:
"Practically all of the cases will be found to involve the construction of state
legislation or the determination of the law in regard to real estate."
See Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheaton 153, x68 (U. S. x827); Green v. Neale,
6 Peters 29i (U. S. 1832).
a 6 Peters i, x7, 18 (1842).
Warren believes that had Story seen the original memorandum of the
Judiciary Act at the time he made this decision, he would have held otherwise.
37 H,.v. L. REV. 49, 8s (1924).
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true intendment and construction, is strictly limited to the
local statutes and local usages before stated and does not
extend to contracts and other instruments of a commercial
nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof are to
be sought, not in decisions of local tribunals, but in the gen-
eral principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence."
The announcement of this new doctrine by Story was to
have, as we shall presently see, a far-reaching effect on the sub-
sequent development of the federal law in cases uder the di-
verse-citizenship clause. Its effect can be likened partially to
Mr. Justice Chase's ruling in United States v. Worrall,9' that
the courts could entertain no indictments for crimes at common
law; which earlier determination, while not appreciated in its
full significance at the time it was announced, yet, later, became
the settled law of federal criminal practice, and may now be
regarded as a landmark in that branch of jurisprudence. Simi-
larly, the decision of Judge Story, that in certain cases the ap-
plicable common law is not to be sought in the decisions of the
state tribunals but in general principles, is a landmark in fed-
eral civil jurisprudence; and, although the extent to which it
would be carried may not have been perceived at the time, this
federal ruling registered the first real departure from the prac-
tice which had theretofore prevailed, under section 34 of the Ju-
diciary Act, of strictly following state decisions. Incidentally,
it is interesting to observe that the game judge who had endeav-
ored, but without success, to assert a broad common-law criminal
jurisdiction in the federal courts, was the first to assert the
right of the federal courts in cases under the diverse-citizenship
clause to disregard state decisions in matters of commercial law
and to administer what he considered to be general principles
of the law merchant, which, though resting largely on the civil
law, is, of course, with us, a branch of the common law.
Professor Gray," in assigning causes which he thought led
to the decision in Swift v. Tyson, says of the writer of the
opinion, that Story, being "possessed by a restless vanity" and
"2 Dallas 384 (C. C. x798).
"GRAY, TnE NATUSM AND Souxcss or LAW (ist ed. iMg), § 539.
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being at the time occupied in writing a "book on bills of ex-
change," was led "to dogmatize on the subject." Other critics 98
have alluded to Story's "restless ambition" as being responsible
for the enunciation of the Swift v. Tyson doctrine; but these
criticisms leave wholly out of account the concurrence of his
brother judges on the bench.
During the same term of court in which Swift v. Tyson was
decided, Judge Story again, in Carpenter v. Insurance Com-
pany,97 when construing a policy of fire insurance, reiterated
the doctrine of the former case, and said:
"The questions under our consideration are questions
of general commercial law, depending upon the construc-
tion of a contract of insurance, which is by no means local
in its character, or regulated by any local policy or custom;
whatever respect, therefore, the decisions of the state tri-
bunals may have on such a subject, and they certainly are
entitled to respect, they cannot conclude the judgment of
this court."
Then-he added these significant words:
"On the contrary, we are bound to interpret this in-
strument according to our opinion of its true intent and
object, aided by all the light which can be obtained from
all external sources whatever; and if the result at which we
have arrived differs from that of these learned state courts,
we may regret it, but it cannot be permitted to alter our
judgment."
A review of the myriad cases decided under the diverse-
citizenship clause since Swift v. Tyson would be both laborious
and uninteresting. The germinal doctrine which Story there
planted has been well watered and nurtured by subsequent jus-
tices of the Supreme Court, and has grown, with occasional
interruptions, until it now covers not only questions of general
commercial law, but also other -fields of common law.
It is interesting to note that in 1892, the Supreme Court, in B. d
"W. M. Meigs, 45 Am. L. REv. 47 (1911).
a4 U. S. (i6 Peters) 495, 511 (I842)..
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0. R. R. Co. v. Baugh,93 gave as one of its reasons for con-
tinuing to extend the doctrine, that, notwithstanding the deci-
sion in Swift v. Tyson, Congress had never altered section 34
of the Judiciary Act so as to compel the Supreme Court to follow
state decisions in every case.99
At the present time no useful purpose would be served by
an attempt to evaluate the various arguments for and against
the original adoption or the subsequent extension of the rule
that, in cases which demand such a course, the federal courts
may and will make their own pronouncements of the governing
law; 100 suffice it to say this rule has become too well established
to be doubted. Our own practical concern is, first, to classify in
a general manner the instances where the United States courts
follow or refuse to follow the law of the state in which a case
was adjudged or whose common law would ordinarily be ap-
plicable on other grounds (as, for example, because a contract
in suit was executed in that state 1 0 1 ), and, next, to determine the
exact nature of the law which is administered when state decisions
are disregarded.
The test seems to be that, if the matter 102 does not involve
the construction or the interpretation of state constitutions, 103 or
" r48 U. S. 368 (1892).
" GRAY, TEE NATURE AND SOURCES oF LAW (ist ed. 1909), § 537.
1 Some of the reasons given for the practice of the federal courts in
deciding independently of state decisions seem to be (x) the feeling that it is
beneath the dignity of the federal court to decide a case according to the
decisions of the state court, when it is convinced that those decisions are wrong
on principle: (2) the hope that what is deemed the better opinion of the
federal court may induce the state court to overrule the decisions which the
federal court regards as erroneous; (3) the possible apprehension that deference
to the decisions of the courts of the particular state in which the action arises
will create an apparently conflicting body of federal precedents, and destroy
uniformity of decision in that court; (4) the hope that a uniform body of
federal precedents unvaried by the state in which the action originates, and
which the contract or transaction in question had its situs, may in time form
the nucleus of a general and uniform body of non-statutory law, to which the
state courts as well as, the federal courts may gradually conform.
' Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Co., 289 Fed. 405, 409 (C. C. A. 1923).
'See generally as to this subject, 33 YAZE L J. 855, 856-7 (1924); 12CAL. L. REv. 425 (1924).
' The federal courts follow the interpretation of the state constitution,
Elmendorf v. Taylor, io Wheaton 152 (U. S. 1825) ; or of the state statutes,
Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165 (1922); McCutchen v. Union Trust Co., 271
Fed. 586 (C. C. A. x92), when the interpretation is given either by a decision
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statutes, or is not concerned with peculiarly local questions 104
and customs, or rules of property,105 the federal courts consider
themselves not bound by local decisions; consequently, in mat-
ters of general concern, there has been opened to them a wide
field of subjects, in the settlement of which they repeatedly have
said they will administer general principles of jurisprudence.
Included within this field comes first in importance, both his-
torically and by its own merits, the subject of commercial pa-
per,108 with all its ramifications and ever-growing interests.
or by repeated dicta of the state court of last resort, Gibson Coal Co. v. Allen,
28o Fed. 28 (C. C. A. 1922). To this general rule there is this qualification
that, if state decisions are conflicting, the latest will prevail unless it nullifies
earlier decisions under which rights had accrued, Burgess v. Seligman, 107
U. S. 2o (1882) ; see also Pease v. Peck, z8 Howard 595, 599 (U. S. 1855).
I"Speaking of matters of "local concern," Mr. Justice Miller, in Bucher v.
Cheshire R. R. Co., 125 U. S. 555, 584 (1887), states the rule to be that
"where local law or custom has been established by repeated decisions of the
highest courts of a state, it becomes the law governing the courts of the United
States sitting in the State."
Matters which have been considered of local concern include evidence,
municipal liability for defects in sidewalks, Detroit v. Osborn, i35 U. S. 492
(z889) ; interpretations of the Statute of Frauds even on questions common
to all statutes, Beckwith v. Clark, z88 Fed. i71 (C. C. A. 1911); and the rule
denying recovery against a carrier for injuries received while traveling on
Sunday. Bucher v. Cheshire R. 1. Co., supra.
'In matters relating to "rules of property" we have such cases as the
construction of deeds and wills, Buford v. Kerr, go Fed. 513 (C. C. A. 1898);
but in Foxcroft v. Mallett, 4 How. 353, 379 (U. S. i846), the court said: "A
decision of a state court upon the construction of a deed as to matters and
language belonging to the common law and not to any local statute, although
entitled to high respect, is not conclusive upon this court!'; the validity of
mortgages, Wilson v. Perrin, 62 Fed. 629 (C. C. A. I894); the rights of
riparian owners, St. Anthony Water Power Co. v. Commissioners, i68 U. S.
349 (i89'7); fraudulent conveyances, Dooley v. Pease, 180 U. S. .126 (i9oo);
chattel mortgages, Cutler v. Huston, 158 U. S. 423 (1894); conditional sales,
Bryant v. Drygoods Co., 214 U. S. 279 (i9W8) ; and adverse possession, Scott
v. Mineral Development Co., 130 Fed. 497 (C. C. A. i9o4). Perhaps the most
striking exception to the rule that the federal courts will follow state decisions
in matters relating to the rules of property is seen in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal
Co.,.215 .U. S. 349 (i9o9). Mr. Justice Holmes filed a strong dissenting
opinion.
Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters I (U. S. 1842) ; Watson v. Tarpley, 18 How-
ard 517 (U. S. i8ss).
"The payee or indorser of a bill upon its presentment and upon refusal
by the drawee to accept has the right to immediate recourse against the drawer.
Ie is not bound to wait to see whether or not the bill will be paid at maturity.
A state statute. which forbids a suit from being brought in such a case until
after maturity of the bill can have no effect upon suits brought in the courts
of the United States." Oates v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 239 (1879) ; Cudahy
Co. v. State Bank, i34 Fed. 538 (C. C. A. I9o4); Taylor v. National Bank,
262 Fed. i68 (D. C. 1919).
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Insurance contracts 107 are likewise looked upon as matters
of general concern, as are also certain contracts which do not
relate to specific property or are not dependent upon state stat-
utes or local usages. s08 In Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Com-
pany,10 9 a building contract, executed in Pennsylvania but to
be performed in Washington, provided for the arbitration of
any dispute arising between the parties. Although the state
courts of both Pennsylvania and Washington regarded this stip-
ulation as valid, a federal circuit court of appeals, in a case in-
volving the contract, denied its validity, following the rule laid
down in former decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Here, Judge Rudkin said:
"It was a settled rule of the common law that a general
agreement to submit to arbitration did not oust the courts
of jurisdiction, and this rule has been consistently adhered
to by the federal courts . . . Opposing counsel concede the
general rule, but maintain that a different rule obtains in
Pennsylvania, where one of the contracts was made, and
in Washington, where the suit is pending, and that this
court should adopt and follow the local rule. But the ques-
tion is one of general law, upon which the decisions of the
[United States] Supreme Court are controlling. As said
by the court in Mitchell v. Dougherty,'10 'We have not felt
called upon to discuss in detail the several Pennsylvania
cases which have been urged upon our attention . . . ; the
question before us is not as to the enforcement of the con-
tract in accordance with the law of the place where it was
"If state statutes do not declare but change the rules of the common law
as to commercial paper, it would seem that the federal courts are bound to
follow the statute." Moses v. Nat. Bank, 149 U. S. 298 (1892); Mutual Life
Ins. v. Lane, 151 Fed. 276 (C. C. 19o7); U. S. Bank v. Daniel, 12 Peters 32
(U. S. 1838).
The most interesting recent example in the field of commercial law is
Salem Trust Co. v. Mfg. Finance Co., 264 U. S. 182 (i92i).
'Carpenter v. Ins. Co., 41 U. S. (16 Peters) 495 (842) ; Meigs v. Lon-
don Assurance Co., z26 Fed. 781 (C. C. i9o4); Bragg v. Meyer, McCall. 4o8,
Fed. Cas. No. i8oi (C. C. 1858).
'Delmas v. Merchants Mutual Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 66z (U. S. 1871); Gil-
bert v. American Surety Co., 121 Fed. 499 (C. C. A. 1902), 19o U. S. 56o
(U. S. i9o2); Edwards v. Davenport, 2o Fed. 756 (C. C. 1883); Reynolds v.
N. Y. Trust Co., 188 Fed. 611 (C. C. A. xg1); Bancroft v. Hambly, 94 Fed.
975 (C. C. A. 18p9).
289 Fed. 405, 409 (C. C. A. 1923)..
'go Fed. 639, 645 (C. C. A. 1898).
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made, but it is as to whether a court of the United States
should, because of the parties' agreement in advance to ab-
stain from invoking its jurisdiction, refuse to enforce the
contract at all, [and,] upon this question, the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States are controlling.'"
In addition to the subjects of commercial paper, insurance,
and certain contractual relations, arising in cases between citi-
zens of different states, it is important also to notice instances of
tort. In this latter field, the fellow-servant rule '11 of the com-
mon law has been recognized and followed on many occasions
by the federal Supreme Court. In Hough v. Railwmay,112 the
common-law rule exempting one from liability to an employee
for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, was
up for consideration, and Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the opin-
ion, said:
"The questions before us, in the absence of statutory
regulations by the state in which the cause of action arose,
depend upon principles of general law, and in their deter-
mination we are not required to follow the decisions of the
state courts."
Later, in the case of Baltimore R. R. Co. v. Baugh,"l " the
question at issue was whether the engineer and fireman of a loco-
motive were fellow servants. The Supreme Court held they oc-
cupied that relation, *saying, by Mr. Justice Brewer:
"The question is essentially one of general law; it does
not depend upon any statute; it does not spring from any
local usage or custom; there is in it no rule of property;
but it rests upon those considerations of right and justice
which have been gathered into the great body of the rules
and principles known as the 'common law.'
Similarly, the courts have recognized, and treated inde-
pendently of state decisions, other phases of tort liability, namely,
'm Chicago & St. Paul R. X. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377 (i884).
100 U. S. 213, 226 (1879).
149 U. S. 368, 370, 378 (1892) ; Mr. Justice Field dissented (p. 39i):
"I think the judgment of the Circuit Court is correct in principle and in accord
with the settled law of Ohio, which, in my opinion, should control the decision."
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nuisance and contributory negligence, 114 as well as the relations
of carriers where the question was not one affecting interstate
commerce.
It may be profitable to notice two cases concerning carriers.
In the first one, Myrick v. Michigan Central R. R. Co.1" 5 the
question was whether a bill of lading, issued in Illinois, was a
through contract. The rulings of the Supreme Court of Illinois
that, as a matter of law, such bills as the one involved consti-
tuted a through contract, were claimed to be conclusive, but the
federal Supreme Court declined to follow the Illinois decisions.
In the second case, Railroad Company v. Prentice,'6 the point
at issue concerned the right to recover from defendant punitive
damages for the wanton and oppressive conduct of one of its
conductors toward a passenger, and the federal Supreme Court
said, through Mr. Justice Gray:
"This question, like others affecting the liability of a
railroad corporation as a common carrier of goods or pas-
sengers-such as its right to contract for exemption from
responsibility for its own negligence, or its liability beyond
its own line, or its liability to one of its servants for the act
of another person in its employment-is a question, not of
local law, but of general jurisprudence, upon which this
court, in the absence of an express statute regulating the
subject, will exercise its own judgment, uncontrolled by the
decisions of the courts of the several states."
'In Snare v. Friedman, 169 Fed. I, 11-12 (C. C. A. x9og), the nature of
a nuisance attractive to children was considered and decided in accordance with
the general principles of jurisprudence, and in disregard of state decisions on
the subject; likewise, the question of what constitutes a nuisance or obstruc-
tion to a navigable stream; Yates v. Milwaukee, xo Wall. 497, 5o6 (U. S.
1869) ; as well as the test to be applied in determining contributory negligence.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Smith, 214 Fed. 942 (C. C. A. 1914); Hemingway v. R. R.
Co., 114 Fed. 843 (C. C. A. 1902).
U3 107 U. S. 102 (1882) ; see also N. Y. R. R. v. Lockwood, I7 Wall. 357,
367 (U. S. 1873); Pa. R. R. Co. v. Hummell, 167 Fed. 89 (C. C. A. i9o9);
B. & 0. v. Thornton, 188 Fed. 868 (C. C. A. i911).
Amendments to the Inter-State Commerce Act, Barnes' Fed. Code, § 7976,
now govern the liability of the initial carrier to the holder of the bill of lading,
and the liability of the connecting carriers to the initial carrier. The relations
of the connecting carriers to the holder of the bill of lading, and to each other,
remain as at common law. Oregon, etc., IL R. Co. v. McGinn, 258 U. S. 4o9,
413 (921).
"" I47 U. S. ioI, io6 (1892).
290 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The examples already given, to which others might be
added,1 7 indicate how broadly the national courts decide cases
on general principles according to their independent view of the
law. By their decisions in cases involving matters of common
concern, arising in litigation between citizens of different states,
and in other fields of jurisdiction,11 these tribunals are gradually
building up a body of unwritten law, national in its scope, and
founded, as the federal judges have constantly emphasized, on
general principles of the common law. Why should not this body
of unwritten law, arising from federal decisions, be accurately
called, what it really is, federal common law?
The name by which we designate non-statutory law will not
change its inherent character. If it be independent federal "com-
mon law," in the sense in which we understand that term, it does
not become something else by being called by a different name;
but the application of such law to particular cases may well prove
confusing, and otherwise harmful, if it is not properly termed.
A Pennsylvanian suing another citizen of his state in reference
to any of the matters of general concern which we have just been
discussing, knows that his rights will be decided by Pennsyl-
vania law; let him, however, be in controversy with a New
Jersey citizen over one of these matters; if the case is in the
federal courts at Philadelphia, under the diverse-citizenship
clause, and there is no state statute involved, his rights are
determined, not by Pennsylvania common law, but by the general
principles of jurisprudence, or common law, as announced and
'See note in 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 381 (1912), for a thorough review of
the subject.
' For example, under Article I, § 2, of the Constitution, the federal judicial
power extends (in addition to the several classes of cases mentioned in the
first lecture, supra, and to be discussed later) to "controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party"; and in Cox v. United States, 31 U. S. (6
Peters) 172 (832), and Duncan v. United States, 32 U. S. (7 Peters) 435
(1833) (both cases of suits on official bonds, signed in Louisiana, to secure the
faithful fulfilment of official duties for the national government in that State),
it was decided that, since the accounting of moneys received by the principal
debtor, or the official in question, had to be at the seat of the national govern-
ment, it was plainly the intent of the parties that the obligations of the contract
of suretyship were to be executed, or performed, there, and, hence, the general,
or common-law, rule that, under such circumstances, the law of the place of
performance applied, controlled in suits on such bonds.
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administered by the federal courts. Simply by crossing the street,
from his state court to the federal tribunal, he may enjoy
rights different from, and be subject to duties other than,
those enforced in his local courts.119 Therefore, in matters
of general concern, a citizen of a particular state, in controversy
with a citizen of another state, should be given a fair opportun-
ity to recognize that-however it may be designated-there is
an independently-built-up body of non-statutory law, adminis-
tered by the federal courts, which may vary from the non-
statutory law of his own state. What is this, if not federal
common law, and why not so term it?
The question just put cannot be answered by saying that,
in view of section 34 of the Judiciary Act (which provides that
the "laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded as rules
of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United
States in cases where they apply"), the law administered by the
federal courts in the kind of litigation under immediate consid-
eration must, somehow, be classed as state common law; for,
even though it be conceded that, in such cases, the federal courts
originally were supposed to follow local decisions, and, in so
doing, to be guided by the common law, as well as the statutory
law of a state, and, further that the accumulation of decisions
in cases determined under this plan would in no sense represent
an independent system of federal law, they did not in all instances
adhere to the plan. As we have seen, instead of "automatically
echoing" the state common law, the federal courts came to adopt,
in what they called cases involving matters of general concern,
their own conceptions of applicable general principles. Did they
not by this method achieve indirectly the same result, so far as
the kind of cases in question are concerned, as would have fol-
lowed had Congress never passed section 34 of the Judiciary
Act? Or was this not in effect saying, under the act, that the
- HARF, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAw, I, 447-9.
"Diverse citizenship jurisdiction in the federal courts now, in many cases,
instead of preventing a discrimination against a non-citizen, results in dis-
crimination in their favor, and against the citizen; and instead of making one
law for all in a state, makes different law for citizen and non-citizen." War-
ren, New Light on the History of the Judiciary Act, 37 H~Av. L. REv. 49, 85
(1924).
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common law of the several states did not apply as rules of deci-
sion in such cases? However, these questions may be answered,
the result is the same--common law differing from state
common law, which, since it is administered by the federal courts,
ought to be called federal common law.
It is not intended to question either the wisdom or propri-
ety of the position taken by the United States courts.
1 20 It
would seem, however, that at least to the extent of what they
term matters of general concern, these tribunals, by the course
pursued, have in fact developed an independent system of federal
common law for the class of cases we have thus far been con-
sidering; though, as shall later be shown, this is by no means
generally conceded, either by the federal judiciary or other writ-
ers on the subject. But, whether the fact involved be conceded
or denied, the evidence remains; and, notwithstanding the protes-
tations to the contrary, the evidence at hand shows the steady,
and probably irresistible, development in this country of what
may be properly termed a federal common law. This is not at
all to be wondered at, for we know that wherever the lawyer
trained in the forms, usages and blessings of the English common
law puts his foot, that system, in some form, is bound to follow.
As stated at the beginning, precise expression and accurate
thought are essentials to one another, and both are necessary to
a proper understanding of any legal system. A lack of correct
terminology in the naming of such a system inevitably leads to
confusion of thought and to the numerous ills which follow in
its wake, two of the most harmful being the presence of legal
subterfuges and endless discussion, both of which hinder the
proper and orderly administration of the law. On the other
hand, calling a legal system by the name which its development
warrants and which correctly describes it, tends to bring about
" For a defense of the position of Mr. Justice Story and subsequent jus-
tices, in deciding matters of general concern independently of state decisions,
see an article in 4 IL. L. Rsv. 533 (1go), where the writer argues that "the
judicial power conferred by the Constitution on federal courts to hear and
decide civil cases at law or in equity arising between citizens of different states,
is analogous to the judicial power to hear and decide controversies between two
or more states."
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straight thinking, the honest expression of views, and, what is
more important, a general, equal and certain application of the
rights and privileges which the system comprehends; thus pre-
venting the partiality which may result when, as at present, the
federal courts in some instances exercise an entirely independent
view of the common law, differing from that of the state in
which the cause is tried, and in other cases, of the same general
class, so far as classes are now marked out and recognized, where
they enforce the state view of the common law, strictly as such.
As before said, it is not necessary to the existence of a fed-
eral common law that the English common law, or any other like
system, be expressly or impliedly adopted either by the Constitu-
tion or by statutes passed in conformity with it. On the contrary,
when federal judges, having parties before them under an auth-
orized jurisdiction, administer what they, in their uncontrolled
judgment, conceive to be the general principles necessary to ef-
fect a just and proper result according to the circumstances of
each case, the accumulation of non-statutory rules thus an-
nounced and applied may, in itself, constitute a system of fed-
eral common law.
If the history of the cases in the United States courts shows
the development of such a system, would it not be best to recog-
nize the fact and proceed henceforth upon that basis, regardless
of whether we like it or not? The question involved, though
momentous, presents but the admission of a reality, which it is
always best to face and acknowledge. Here, it must be remem-
bered, the proposition is to acknowledge, not that a common-law
system exists in the sense that jurisdiction may be taken there-
under of causes of action not either expressly or impliedly pro-
vided for in the written laws of the United States,12' but the fact
For example, it has frequently been held that, since there is no common
law of the United States (in the broad sense of that term), whatever claim to
priority the United States may have in the payment of debts due, it must rest,
not upon the theory of sovereign prerogative, but upon the express provisions
of Congressional statutes. At common law, it is true, the sovereign is entitle
to priority over the claims of individual creditors, and that such a priority was
asserted and recognized can be seen from English cases. Furthermore, certain
states have recognized this prerogative of the Crown as part of their own com-
mon law; but in the case of the United States Government, such a common
law priority was early denied: U. S. v. Bank of North Carolina, 6 Peters 29
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that, in certain classes of litigation, where jurisdiction is duly
authorized and there are no constitutional or statutory rules
which control the case, applicable common-law principles will be
applied by the federal courts independently of the source whence
derived, and that the pursuing of this course in the past, has given
us, as it was bound to do, an independent system of federal com-
mon law.
(To be concluded.*)
Robert von Moschzisker.
-delphia, Pa.
1832), per Story, J.; see also Equitable Trust Co. v. Connecticut Brass
Corp., 29o Fed. 712, 716-23 (C. C. A. i923), for a discussion of the
It seems also that the National government does not possess the com-plerogative of parens patriae. See Wheaton v. Peters, supra; Walker
Newspaper Co., 53o Fed. 593 (C. C. z9o4).
This the second of a series of three articles appearing in successive
the UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAw REVIEw.
